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Abstract 
A supply chain network equilibrium problem was recently formulated using the variational 
inequality approach and solved with the modified projection method. Assuming the vector 
function F that enters the variational inequality is strictly monotone and Lipschitz continuous 
(and that a solution exists). The realization of the modified projection algorithm for the 
supply chain network equilibrium model is guaranteed to converge; however, its algorithmic 
steps are not so interesting to the transportation community as the concept of traffic 
assignment is not used. In this paper, a new solution algorithm that iteratively solves a 
fixed-demand traffic assignment problem and makes comparisons among intermediate 
solutions is proposed. The proposed algorithm is well explained by a supernetwork 
representation, and in addition, loosely justified by a numerical example. The proposed 
solution algorithm can be extended to solve the time-dependent/dynamic supply chain 
network equilibrium model without difficulty. 
Keywords: supply chain network equilibrium, variational inequality, traffic assignment 
 
1. Introduction 
The supply chain network (SCN) equilibrium problem was recently formulated using the 
variational inequality approach (Nagurney et al., 2002, 2003). Such a mathematical model 
was first appeared in the literature and can be analytically solved. Despite its current 
“abstract” form, the SCN equilibrium model has great potential for further development. 
Interesting research direction includes dynamic/time-dependent extension, treatment of 
stochastic/fuzzy input data, incorporation of telecommunicating links and among others. In 
this paper, we only focus on the algorithmic issue. 
 
For solving the SCN equilibrium model that uses the variational inequality (VI) approach, 
Nagurney et al. (2002) proposed the modified projection method. Under the assumption of the 
vector function F that enters the VI is strictly monotone and Lipschitz continuous (and that a 
solution exists), the realization of the modified projection algorithm for the SCN equilibrium 
model is guaranteed to converge. Indeed, the modified projection algorithm is not so 
intriguing to the transportation community as the commonly known traffic assignment 
concept is not adopted within the algorithmic procedure. In the following, a new solution 
algorithm will be proposed and elaborated. We first begin with the introduction of a supply 
chain supernetwork, consisting three tiers of the manufacturer, the retailer and the demand 
markets in Section 2. The proposed algorithm is described in Section 3 and validated with a 




2. The Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Problem 
The SCN network represents economic sectors in tiers, each tier/sector contains a number of 
its members, and each member is denoted by a node. The nodes between the consecutive tiers 
are connected by links in which the products can flow from one sector to its successive sector. 
In Figure 1, three sectors: manufacturer, retailer and demand market are shown. The products 
are first produced by the m competitive manufactures (indexed by i) and then shipped to the n 
retailers (indexed by j) and finally, cleared at the o demand markets (indexed by k). The 
quantities of the product produced, shipped, displayed, stored and transacted in the tiers are 
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Figure 1: Supply Chain Network Representation 
 
Let Q1, qij and Q2 denote product flows between manufacturer and retailer sector, the amount 
of the product transacted between manufacturer i and retailer j, product flows between 
retailers and demand markets. In each tier, cost incurred and revenue generated is different. A 
manufacturer is associated with the marginal production and marginal transaction costs and 
with the sales revenue. A retailer is associated with the marginal purchase and handling cost 
(such as display and storage cost) and with the sales revenue. A demand market is associated 
with the retailer’s supply cost and the transaction cost in the market. 
  
2.1 Equilibrium conditions 
The equilibrium conditions for the SCN model state that product manufactured must be 
shipped to the successive retailer tier and then cleared in the demand markets. In equilibrium, 
all shipments between the tiers of network agencies will have to coincide. For the easier 
reference, the equilibrium conditions and the VI model for the SCN equilibrium problem that 
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appeared in Nagurney et al. (2002) is restated without detailed explanation. 
2.1.1 Equilibrium conditions for the manufacturers 
We assume that each manufacturer i is faced with a production cost ( )*1Qf Mi ∗  and associated 
with a transaction cost ( )∗∗ ijMij qc  between manufacturer i and retailer j. Manufactures obtain a 
price for the product (which is endogenous) and seek to determine their optimal production 
and shipment quantities, given the production costs as well as the transaction costs associated 
with conducting business with the different retailers. The equilibrium conditions for the 
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 (3) 
Eqn (1) states that if a manufacturer i produces a positive amount of the product ∗iq , then the 
manufacturer’s marginal production cost ( )*1ˆ Qf Mi  should be equal to the minimum supply 
cost ∗Miλ  (which is essentially the dual variable associated with the constraint 3 and is hence 
unrestricted in sign). Otherwise, the manufacturer’s marginal production cost should be 
greater than or equal to the minimum supply cost. Eqn (2) indicates that if a manufacturer i 
ships to a retailer j a positive amount of the product ∗ijq  (and the flow on that corresponding 
link will be positive) then the manufacturer’s minimum supply cost ∗Miλ  plus marginal 
transaction cost ( )*ˆ ijMij qc ∗  associated with that wholesaler is equal to the price ∗MijP  that the 
manufacturer i charges (and a wholesaler j is willing to pay) for the product. Otherwise, the 
manufacturer’s minimum supply cost plus marginal transaction cost is greater than or equal to 
the price for the product. Eqn (3) expresses that the product ∗iq  produced in the 








2.1.2 Equilibrium Conditions for the Retailers 
Retailers must agree with the manufacturers as to the volume of shipments since they are 
faced with the handling cost associated with having the product in their retail outlet. In 
addition, they seek to maximize their profits with the price that the retailers are willing to pay 
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Eqn (4) states that a manufacturer i ships to a retailer j a positive amount of product ∗ijq  (and 
the flow on that corresponding link will be positive) then the price that the manufacturer 
charges ∗MijP  (and a retailer j is willing to pay) plus minimum marginal transaction cost 
( )∗∗ 1ˆ QcRj  associated with that retailer is equal to the retailer’s supply cost ∗Rjλ  (which is 
essentially the dual variable associated with the constraint 6 and is hence unrestricted in sign) 
for the product. Otherwise, the price that the manufacturer charges plus the retailer’s 
minimum marginal handling cost is larger than or equal to the retailer’s supply cost for the 
product. Eqn (5) states that if a retailer j ships to demand market k a positive amount of the 
product ∗jkq , then the retailer supply cost 
∗R
jλ  is equal to the price 
∗R
jP  that the retailer 
charges. Otherwise, the retailer’s supply cost is larger than or equal to the price. Eqn (6) 















 shipped to all retailers. 
2.1.3 Equilibrium Conditions for Customers 
Consumers determine their optimal consumption levels from the various retailers subject both 
to the prices charges for the product as well as the cost for conducting the transaction (which, 
of course, may include the cost of transportation associated with obtaining the product from 





























































*P  (8) 
Eqn (7) states that if the customers at demand market k purchase from retailer j a positive 
amount of the product ∗jkq , then the price 
∗R
jP  charged by the retailer for the product plus 
the transaction cost ( )*2QcDjk∗  is equal to the price *DkP  that the consumers are willing to 
pay for the product. Otherwise, the price charged by the retailer for the product plus the 
transaction cost is equal to the price of the product at the demand market. Eqn (8) indicates 
that if the equilibrium price ∗RkP  that the consumers are willing to pay for the product at the 






*  purchased of the product from the 
retailers will be precisely equal to the demand ( )*Dkd P  for that product at the demand 
market. Otherwise, the demand is less than or equal to the total amount of commodities 
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available at the demand market. These conditions correspond to the well-known spatial price 
equilibrium conditions.  
2.2 Model Formulation 
Note that the SCN equilibrium problem embeds asymmetric link interactions, which may be 
exemplified by the complete competition of the manufacturers with different sizes. Therefore, 
it is appropriate to formulate the SCN equilibrium problem as a VI model. For a description 
of the VI model, see Nagurney (1993) and Chen (1999). The following theorem defines the 
SCN equilibrium problem. 
Theorem 1: The SCN equilibrium problem is equivalent to finding an equilibrium solution 
Ω∈= ∗∗∗∗∗ },{ 21 DP,, kQQX λ  to the following VI model. 




                                







































































































where Ω  denotes the feasible region which is delineated by the constraints (10)~(16). 
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P  (12) 
Nonnegative constraints: 
i   qi ∀≥   0  (13) 
ji   qij ,  0 ∀≥  (14) 
kj   q jk ,  0 ∀≥  (15) 
k   PDk ∀>   0  (16) 
Constraints (10)~(12) have been interpreted in Section 2.1. Constraints (13)~(16) require that 
productions, transactions and demand prices respectively be nonnegative. For the equivalency 
proof between the SCN model (9) and its corresponding equilibrium conditions (1)~(8), the 
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reader may refer to Nagurney et al. (2002) for details. 
 
3. Solution Algorithm 
We propose a two-loop solution algorithm in this section. The outer loop estimates the 
demands of the product and with this estimated demands, the inner loop performs a fixed 
demand traffic assignment. The product flows and prices that obtained are again used to 
update the product demands. This procedure is repeated until the convergence criterion is 
satisfied. The algorithmic steps are stated as follows: 
Step 0: Initialization. 
Step 0.1: Set initial product prices to zero, { } { }00 =Dkp  and compute their 
corresponding demands as the upper bound ( ){ }*DMaxkd P . Also set zero as their 
lower bound ( ){ }0* =DMinkd P  and the pre-specified increment { }0k∆ . Set p=0. 
Step 1: Traffic Assignment. (by the Frank-Wolfe method) 
Step 1.0: Let ( ){ }pDkd *P = ( ){ }*DMaxkd P . For each pair (I,k) (where I represents 
super-origin in the supernetwork), perform all-or-nothing assignment (the shortest 





and )0(Djkc . This yields (Q
1)0, { }0jq , (Q2)0, set l=0. 




ij qc )(ˆ , 
lR
j Qc )(ˆ
1 , and lDjk Qc )(
2 . 
Step 1.2: Direction finding. Perform all-or-nothing assignment based on the updated 
information obtained in Step 1.1. This yields a set of auxiliary flows (G1)l, { }ljg , 
(G2)l. Set ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )lDjklDjklMijlMijlij qgqgd −−= , . 
Step 1.3: Line search. 
Solve the linear combination optimization problem (by substituting the values of 
the decision variables at iteration l by those at iteration l+1) for step size α : 
Step 1.4: Update of product flows. Update the link flows by the following formulas:  
( ) ( ) lijlMijlMij dqq α+=+1  (17) 
( ) ( ) ljklDjklDjk dqq α+=+1  (18) 









11  (19) 
Step 1.5: Convergence check.  
If the convergence criterion is satisfied, set { }DkP  as the shortest path distance 
from super-origin I to demand market k’, and continue. Otherwise, let l=l+1, go to 
step 1.1.  
Step 2: Convergence check. 





















, the convergence criterion 
is satisfied, stop. Otherwise, do the following: 
Step 2.1: Comparison of product demands. 
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Case 1: If ( ) ( ) ε>− +1** pDkpDk dd PP , set pkpk ∆=∆ +1 . 
Case 2: If ( ) ( ) ε−<− +1** pDkpDk dd PP , set 2/1 pkpk ∆=∆ + . 
Case 3: If ( ) ( ) ε<− +1** pDkpDk dd PP , set 01 =∆ +pk  
Step 2.2: Update of product demands. 
Set ( ) ( ) pkDkDk dd ∆−= *max*max PP . Let p=p+1, go to step 1. 
4. Numerical Example 
To demonstrate, a numerical example modified from Nagurney et al. (2002) is solved for the 
SCN model. As shown in Figure 1, the test network consists three sectors, i.e., manufacturer, 
retailer and demand market respectively. Each sector contains two agencies. Cost functions 
associated with the three tiers of the test network are given in Table 1. 




Cost Transaction Cost Price
M * iiMi qqqqQf 25.2)( 2121 ++= Miλ  * ijijij
M
ij qqqc 5.35.0)(
2 +=  MijP  
R * 2)(5.0)( jj
R
j qqf =  
R
jλ  － 
R
jP  
D － － 5)( 2 += jk
D
jk qQc  
D
kP  
Remarks: “M” denotes manufacturers, “R” retailers, and “D” demand markets; 
“*” denotes derivative information is required. 
 
The demands can be expressed as functions of the relevant prices. Two demand functions for 
two agencies, are assumed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Demand Functions ( )DPkd  
10005.12)(. 211 +−−=
DD PPd DP  
10005.12)( 122. +−−=
DD PPd DP  
 
The test results of link costs and product flows are summarized in Tables 3 and 4.  
Table 3: Link Costs 
Cost 
Function Production/Display Cost 
Supply 
Cost Transaction Cost Price 
( ) 296.20125Qˆ 2111 =++= qqf M
M ( ) 296.20125Qˆ 1212 =++= qqf M
 * ( ) 108.205.3ˆ =+= ijijMij qqc  404.221=MijP
R * ( ) 216.33ˆ == jjRj qqf  Rjλ  － 616.254=RjP
D － － ( ) 608.2152 =+= jkDjk qQc  224.276=DkP
Remarks: “M” denotes manufacturers, “R” retailers, and “D” demand markets 
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4. Conclusion and Suggestion 
This paper proposed a trial-and-error solution algorithm for solving the SCN model using the 
VI approach and validated with a numerical example that was taken from Nagurney et al’ 
(2002). The proposed algorithm is very intriguing in that the well-known traffic assignment 
procedure can be iteratively applied to a supernetwork representation. 
It is known that under the assumption of perfect competition, the product price will usually 
affect the amount of the manufacturers’ productions, which will in turn affect the product 
price in the demand market. This recursive procedure is expected to approach equilibrium 
conditions. However, this is not the case with our numerical example and therefore the 
alternative solution algorithm that adopts the trial-and-error technique is employed. For 
insights, the characteristics of demand functions need to be elaborated in the future and in 
addition, the computational efficiency of the proposed algorithm be further tested/improved 
with larger and asymmetric networks. 
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ijc : transaction cost function for shipment from manufacturer i to retailer j 
M
ijĉ : marginal transaction cost function for shipment from manufacturer i to retailer j 
R
jkc : transaction cost function for shipment from retailer j to demand market k 
R
jkĉ : marginal transaction cost function for shipment from retailer j to demand market k 
M
if : production cost function associated with manufacturer i 
M






















i: manufacturer designation, Ii∈ ; set { } ,,,,2,1 miI =  
j: retailer designation, Jj∈ ; set { } ,,,,2,1 njJ =  
k: demand market designation, Kk ∈ ; set { } ,,,,2,1 okK =  
*M
ijP : equilibrium price that the manufacturer i charges to the retailer j 
*R
jkP : equilibrium price that the retailer j charges to the demand market k 
*D
kP : equilibrium price in the demand market k 
iq : productions from manufacturer i 
ijq : the amount of transactions between manufacturer i and retailer j 
jkq : the amount of transactions between retailer j and demand market k 
T: time period designation, Tt∈ ; set { } ,,,,2,1 TtT =  
M
iλ : minimum supply cost for manufacturer i 
R
jλ : minimum supply cost for retailer j 
R
kλ : minimum supply cost for demand market k 
